This article deals with the elevation of the administrative status of Jerusalem from vilāya to niyāba and the impact of this transformation on the judicial organization and the appointments in the city. During the early Mamluk period, Jerusalem remained as wilāya, a less significant administrative unit, subordinate to the nā’ib of Damascus. However, in the later eighth/fourteenth century, the city was turned into a separate niyāba, an administrative unit governed by the viceroy (nā’ib al-saltana) of the sultan, and attached directly (...) to Cairo, the political centre of the Mamluks. While the existing scholarship tends to see this change as a manoeuvre against the Crusader threat, this article argues that the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem was associated with the bureaucratic centralisation of the Mamluk Sultanate and the religious importance of the city. Unlike the Ayyubid politics of fragmented sovereignty between the dynasty members, the Mamluks appointed viceroys on behalf of the sultan to the significant cities of Syria. Therefore, the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem can be seen as a continuation of this attempt toward the centralisation of the Syro-Egyptian lands. On the other hand, with this change, the Mamluk sultan had the opportunity to express his patronage over Jerusalem in a more powerful way and to control the administrative, judicial, and scholarly realms in the city directly. What is more important in terms of the judicial practices is that Jerusalem was introduced to four chief judgeships (Shāfi‘ī, Hanafī, Mālikī, and Hanbalī) within the thirty-year period after the founda-tion of niyāba. All these changes meant that the city became bureaucratically more integrated with Cairo so that the Cairene elite were increasingly in-volved in local appointments of scholars. Moreover, it became increasingly crucial for Jerusalemite scholars to have connections with Cairene bureaucrats in order to secure scholarly positions in Jerusalem. (shrink)

As in classical Latin philosophical and theological texts, Spinoza did not make any semantic distinction between the concepts of conscientia and conscius, and used one interchangeably. But the concept of conscientia is used as an “inner voice” or “conscience” meaning “moral sensitivity” or “moral awareness” and expresses both rational and irrational processes in traditioanl philosophy. On the other hand, the concept of conscius is used in the sense of “consciousness” and expresses a mental or psychological reflexive activity based on rational (...) processes in the same tradition. Based on Spinoza's use of the two concepts in the same sense, this study claims that “moral sensitivity” is formed as a result of reflexive thinking, which is a mental action. Where consciousness is understood as a reflexive activity based on the relationship between ideas, it is argued that “moral awareness” occurs in the mind as an idea formed as a result of the relationship between ideas. In the study, it is determined that Spinoza developed a kind of “moral consciousness” theory based on the awareness in question, rather than a “conscience theory”. The main focus of the study is that the idea of “good” and “evil”, which are the basic concepts in Spinoza’s ethics, arise from the idea of “joy” and “sadness” that occur as emotions in the mind. Here, “joy” or “sadness” is considered as the primary ideas that occur in the mind as a result of the affection of the body, and “good” or “bad” as secondary ideas formed by the mind as a result of contemplation on these primary ideas. In the article, the theory of “moral consciousness” is based on the “ideas of ideas”, which are the secondary ideas in question. Keywords: Consciousness, Conscience, Awareness, Moral Consciousness, Good-Evil, Joy-Sadness. (shrink)

A religião tem um relevante papel de modelagem da vida social na história humana. Em todas as sociedades organizadas e não organizadas, a influência da religião na organização da vida social do indivíduo é realmente grande. Além dos laços legais que unem as pessoas na sociedade, os laços religiosos também são importantes. Em suma, a afirmação “A história da humanidade é moldada pela profunda influência da religião” não deve ser subestimada. Este estudo aborda como Spinoza define os conceitos de Deus, (...) mente e autoridade. (shrink)

Peripatetik felsefî yaklaşımın en önemli filozoflarından birisi olarak kabul edilen İbn Rüşd, dönemin felsefe paradigması içinde hemen her alana dair eserler kaleme almış bir düşünürdür. Onun kaleme aldığı eserlerin çok büyük bir kısmı, Aristoteles’in eserlerine dair şerhler oluşturmaktadır. Bu sebeple o Büyük Şarih olarak anılmıştır. Bu şerhler büyük, orta ve küçük şeklinde üç tarzda yazılmıştır. Burada Türkçeye çevirdiğimiz eser, Aristoteles’in Organon diye bilinen mantık külliyatının ikinci kitabı olarak kabul edilen Peri Hermeneias adlı eserin orta şerhidir. Bu eserin genel muhteviyatı isim, (...) fiil ve edat gibi genel lafızlarla başlar, önermenin yapısı, niteliği, niceliğiyle devam ederek ve önermelerin modalitesiyle son bulmaktadır. Ele alınan konuların kapsamı Peri Hermeneias ile aynı derece ve sıralamaya sahiptir. Yer yer İbn Rüşd, yaklaşımına dair yeni şeyler eklese de eser, daha çok bir serbest çeviriyi andırmaktadır. (shrink)

Maḳâle fî ṣınâʿati'l-manṭıḳ, the only work of Maimonides on logic, has a distinctive feature in point of presenting a logical summary based on terms. This article shaped by titles, which evaluates the opinions here in the form of explanation, comparison and analysis for many reasons; philosophy of logic, preparation for logic, concepts, propositions, comparison and five arts. In the philosophy of logic, it is examined what kind of knowledge logic is in the context of its relationship with philosophy and sciences (...) and its necessity for the certainty of knowledge. In the logic preparation part, two basic problems, namely the concepts of relational existence and the theory of causality, are discussed. These are not direct problems of logic, but are considered as preparatory issues for a better understanding of logic. Five universals, categories and definition theory are included in the concepts. In the propositions section, propositions are discussed and evaluated according to their quality, quantity, counter-affirmation situations, modality and rotation situations. In the syllogism part, the basic concepts, figures, modes and types of qiyas are included. In the five arts section, the five arts and the propositions that can be precursors are emphasized. (shrink)

Immortality, or life after death one of the deep-rooted problamatics that most noteworthy backgrounded and never losing its freshness, in the philosophic-thelogical custom. While the expectations of people about the next life, is satisfied as ‘resurrection’ by the theistic beliefs doctorines-thoughts, it is also answered as ‘soul immortality’ by the philosophical approaches. But it is impossible to say both thesis have smootly aspects. In this study, we will rank how this ancient problematic in the history of thought is dealt with (...) in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Sadra offers an original doctrine of resurrection, which is based on the existential evolution of the self and continues to develop in a continuous process. This doctrine, in which the theories of substantive movement, abstractness of imagination and selestial-spiritual bodies are used as basic parameters, is a critical answer to the philosophical doctrine that acknowledges the continuity of spiritual existence with the classical thelogical thought that advocates the return of worldly bodies. In this respect, it appears as a third alternative alternative for Islamic eschatology, trapped between theories of de resurrection through biological body and spiritual immortality. (shrink)

This book provides an overview of recent debates about critical theory from Pierre Bourdieu via Luc Boltanski to the Frankfurt School. Robin Celikates investigates the relevance of the self-understanding of ordinary agents and of their practices of critique for the theoretical and emancipatory project of critical theory.

Günümüzde insan zihni çeşitli algı yönetimi metodlarıyla saldırıya mâruz kalmaktadır. Medya insan algılarını yönetmekte sıkça başvurulan bir araçtır. Bu yöntemlerin etkisiyle insanlar gerçeklerden daha çok algılarına göre hareket etmektedir. Oysa algılar her zaman gerçeğe tekabül etmez. Bu bağlamda Batı dünyasının yeni ötekisi/düşmanı Müslümanlar hakkındaki olumsuz algı en çok Kur’an-ı Kerim üzerinden oluşturulur. Araştırmamızda güncel algılara aykırı görünen iki örnek Kur’an perspektifinden incelenmektedir. Bu meseleler Hz. Muhammed’in Hz. Aişe ve Hz. Zeyneb’le yaptığı evlilikler, çok evlilik mevzusu ve kölelik meselesidir. Çalışmamız nitel (...) bir araştırma olup literatür taramasına dayanmaktadır. Öncelikle bu konuların Hicaz-Arap kültüründe ve Kur’an’da nasıl yer aldığı ele alınmaktadır. Örnek olarak incelenen uygulamaların var olan kültüre uygunluğu müşrik, Yahudi ve münafıkların meseleye bakışıyla ortaya konulmaktadır. Ardından bu hususlarla ilgili oryantalist ve ülkemizdeki İslam dinine önyargılı bazı yazarların iddialarına yer verilmektedir. Araştırmacıların artık bigâne kalamayacağı sosyal medyadan da bazı örneklerden istifade edilmektedir. Nihayetinde şöyle bir tablo ortaya çıkmaktadır. Güncel algı, önce değer haline getirilmekte; daha sonra da bu algı başka zamanlara teşmil edilerek değerlendirme ölçütü olmakta ve bu ölçüye uymayan farklı uygulamalar itibarsızlaştırılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Kur’an ayetleri başta olmak üzere klasik eserlerdeki rivayetlerden hareketle bir itibarsızlaştırma faaliyeti yapılmaktadır. Fakat Kur’an-ı Kerim ayetleri sosyo-kültürel ortamlarından uzak bir şekilde literal okunarak çarpıtma yapılmakta ve genellikle anakronizme düşülmektedir. (shrink)

The traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt that were seen almost in all the types of Islamic sciences appeared in the sources of tafsīr from early periods. These traditions that were generally used to explain the Qurʾān were seen problem and critisized by some exegetical specialists. Even though corresponding to a relative later period in the classical era, an approach was tried to put forward in view of the traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt. This methodological concern for isrāʾīliyyāt in classical period has increased and been (...) influential for many researchers from east and west to work on this issue in modern times. There has been reached to important results about the issues of the definition of isrāʾīliyyāt, the source of it, its spread in Islamic sciences, its aim of usage, the progress of these positive-negative attitudes against these traditions in historical process. But it is important to discuss some evaluations and analysis again that put forward in this process when different cases about the issue are taken into consideration. According to this, a series of problem, such as how the isrāʾīliyyāt can be defined in tafsīr, when the criticism of isrāʾīliyyāt started, whether Biqāʿī was the first exegete who made reference to Bible or not will be discussed considering relevant resources in this article.Summary: Since the early periods, isrā’īliyyāt narratives were used as a source of information in tafsīrs. These narratives, which are transmitted in various tafsīrs of the Qur’ān, one of the main sources of Islamic religion, have also taken the methodological interests of some exegete since the early periods. This interest continued in the modern period, and both Western and Eastern researchers made research on isrā’īliyyāt. Some of the findings, analyses, and claims available in researches on this subject will be reexamined in this article. The first of these is the problem of the definition of isrā’īliyyāt. In contemporary research, inclusive definitions are made for isrā’īliyyāt, seen in all sources. These definitions do not allow for a refined description of isrā’īliyyāt which is handled in terms of different intentions in the sources of each different field and which varies in terms of the issues it covers, leading to the underestimation of some of its aspects in relevant fields. In the definitions, it is stated that isrā’īliyyāt is mostly learned from the Ahl al-Kitāb, (the People of the Book) it became widespread along with Islām and it included narratives about caliphs, dynasties, and Mahdī, as well. Another issue is to be emphasized that they are fictive or mythological. In classical tafsīrs, isrā’īliyyāt is observed to be related mainly with the history of the Ahl al-Kitāb or with the subjects they know about. In the modern era, the narratives about the ancestors of the Arabs have been identified as isrā’īliyyāt. If some of the isrā’īliyyāt narratives are related to the history of Arabs, then their resource should be the historical-cultural memory of Arabs. However, as almost all Qur’ānic stories were somewhat known before the revelation period and relations with the Ahl al-Kitāb dated back to times long before the Islamic period, the claim that these narratives became widespread along with Islām should be revised. It is also problematic to emphasize the legendary nature of some of the isrā’īliyyāt and to make that as a reason to reject all. Such emphasis also leads to the underestimation of the functions of narratives in tafsīrs. In isrā’īliyyāt, tafsīr was used for i) interpreting the ambiguous words in the stories, ii) to bring evidence to the Ahl al-Kitāb, and ii) tarhīb-targhīb (encouragement-warning). These narratives can be used as a source in tafsīr unless they are explicitly falsified by the data of fields such as history, history of religions and archaeology as well as the Qur’ān and the true Sunnah. The first criticisms of isrā’īliyyāt are claimed to belong to exegete like Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 543/148) or Ibn ‘Aṭīyah (d. 541/1147). However, criticism of isrā’īliyyāt is also observed in the tafsīrs of earlier exegete, such as al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) or al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067). They do not necessarily have to use the term isrā’īliyyāt explicitly in their criticism like the later ones. If the narratives they criticize and the reasons for their criticism are the same as those of the later exegete, it will be necessary to date the criticism of isrā’īliyyāt back to the 4th Century of the Hegira. The understanding that "the expression in the story is sufficient, it is unnecessary to deal with the ambiguities; instead, it is necessary to deal with the lesson and wisdom in the story" is one of the criteria that Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), who is deemed to be the pioneer of the strict criticism of isrā’īliyyāt in the modern period, took as basis in this criticism, is valid for the exegete of the classical period, as well. Although exegete, such as al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Māturīdī, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344) who had this understanding, gave place to isrā’īliyyāt, these people recognized that "these narratives were not final, binding or necessary”, indeed. The understanding that such expression in the story is sufficient, which is one of the reasons for such awareness in the classical period, seems to have turned into a strict rejection in the modern period. Another issue is the claim that Biqā‘ī (d. 885/1480) was the first exegete to systematically benefit from the Bible in tafsīr in the classical period. However, al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197) before Biqā‘ī, is also observed to have used the Old Testament systematically in tafsīr. He cited the Tanakh in his period in two ways. He either directly quoted from the translation of Tanakh or the Hebrew text written in Arabic letters. Another exegete who used the Tanakh as a source in his tafsīr was al-Ṣafadī (d. 696/1296). He enriched his tafsīr with systematic quotations from the Tanakh. Therefore, the use of the Bible as a source of interpretation in the classical period should not be started with Biqā‘ī. The reason why the pioneer exegete of the classical period did not directly use the Bible is claimed to be the fact that they falsified it and deemed the isrā’īliyyāt narrated from the predecessors to be more reliable. However, it is known that a significant portion of the isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is based on written sources, particularly including the apocryphal texts. So just like the Bible, isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is problematic in terms of authenticity. This allows us to argue that classical exegete have an inconsistent attitude, indeed. On the other hand, when we take into account the fact that classical exegetes criticize these narratives from time to time and believe that they are not final or binding, the problem of potential inconsistency disappears. Accordingly, they did not deem chain transmission of these narratives from the predecessors by reliable transmitters to be a sufficient reason for their acceptance and adoption for good and all. (shrink)

This article argues that, far from being a merely defensive act of individual protest, civil disobedience is a much more radical political practice. It is transformative in that it aims at the politicization of questions that are excluded from the political domain and at reconfiguring public space and existing institutions, often in comprehensive ways. Focusing on the reconstitution of the political community also allows us to reconceptualize constituent power. Rather than portraying it as a quasi-mythical force erupting only in extraordinary (...) moments, constituent power can be conceptualized as a dynamic situated within established orders, transgressing their logic and reconfiguring them from within. Civil disobedience as a transformative and potentially comprehensive practice aimed at reconstituting the political order can then be seen as an internal driving force keeping this dialectic in play. A concrete example can be found in protests and border struggles by irregularized migrants. They show how unexp... (shrink)

Bu makale, Ebu’l-Muʿîn en-Nesefî’nin peygamberliğin aklî olarak gerekçelendirilmesine yönelik ortaya koyduğu rasyonel argümanlarını ele almaktadır. Makale, tartışmaya en-Nesefî’nin peygamberlik kavramından ne anladığını ele alarak başlar ve onun tarafından kavramın lügavî, felsefî ve kelâmî anlamlarına dair sunulan görüşler tasnif edilir. Ardından, en-Nesefî’de nübüvvetin, aklî açıdan mümkün ve Allah’ın hikmeti açısından vâcib olmak üzere, iki farklı kategorik açıdan ele alınışı işlenir. En-Nesefî nübüvvetin hem aklen mümkün oluşuna hem de onun Allah’ın hikmeti gereği gerekli oluşuna dair birçok argüman sunar. İnsan aklının bilgiye ulaşma (...) kapasitesinin sınırlı oluşu, dini bilginin açık ve sarih bir şekilde ortaya konulmasının gerekliliği ve yine gelecek nesiller için bu bilginin korunmasına ve depolanmasına duyulan ihtiyaç peygamberlik müessesesinin makul, mümkün ve gerekli oluşuna dair çok değerli iç görüler sunar. En-Nesefî’ye göre “yıldızların ilmi veya bilgisi” ve tıp bilimine dair insanlığın sahip olduğu malumat, yine insanların yaşamlarını devam ettirebilmeleri için gerekli olan kimi sanat ve zanaatkarlığa dair önemli bilgilerin öğrenilip bu güne aktarılmış olması peygamberlik müessesesinin tarihte gerçekleşmiş bir vakıa olduğunu gösteren aklî çıkarımlardandır. Dahası en-Nesefî’ye göre insanlar arasındaki ilk dil de bir peygamber tarafından öğretilmiş ve diğer diller bu ilk dilden türemiştir. Makalenin ikinci kısmı, en-Nesefî’nin nübüvvet iddiasında bulunan birinin iddiasının geçerli olup olmadığına dair sunduğu kriterler ya da kıstaslar üzerine yoğunlaşır. En-Nesefî peygamberlik iddiasında bulunan birisinin iddiasını temellendirmesinin en etkili yolunu mucize olarak görür. Ardından mucizenin tanımına ve onun kelâmî ve felsefî gelenekler içerisinde nasıl anlaşıldığına dair bazı açıklamalar yapar ve mucizenin sıhhatine dair şartları tartışır. Örneğin mucizeler, becerilerini mükemmelleştirmek için yıllarını harcamış sihirbazlar tarafından gerçekleştirilen illüzyonlardan veya sihir numaralarından ayrılır. Bu kişiler, el çabukluğu kullanarak olağanüstü görünen numaralar sergileyebilirler çünkü onlar göz yanılması sayesinde izleyicileri aldatmaya yönelik zengin bir deneyim ve uzmanlığa sahiptirler. Bununla birlikte, daha yakından incelenip derinlemesine düşünüldüğünde, illüzyon numaralarının ardındaki nedenler keşfedildikçe, hilelerinin gizemi ve gücü yavaş yavaş azalır. Fakat, mucizeler araştırıldıkça ve üzerine düşünüldükçe giderek daha kesin ve güçlü hale gelirler. Sonuç olarak en-Nesefî’ye göre sadece entelektüel bir Tanrı anlayışı ya da inancı kişiyi din tarafından müjdelenen mutluluğa ulaştırmak için yeterli değildir. Kişinin dünya üzerindeki varlığını tatmin edici bir anlama (hikmet) bağlayabilmesinin, yine hem bu dünyaya hem de öbür dünyaya dair menfaatlerinin farkında olup onları elde etmeyi öğrenmesinin yegâne yolu peygamberlik müessesesidir. Özetle, bu makale, en-Nesefî’de nübüvvet kavramının kapsamlı bir analizini ortaya koyarak ve onun nübüvveti destekleyen rasyonel argümanlarını tartışarak, İslam düşüncesinde nübüvvet kavramının ve nübüvvete getirilen aklî savunuların daha derin bir şekilde anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmayı ve yapılacak olan muhtemel modern aklî savunuların hangi hususlara odaklanması ya da mecralara yönelmesi gerektiğinin ipuçlarını ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to show that mainstream liberal accounts of civil disobedience fail to fully capture the latter’s specific characteristics as a genuinely political and democratic practice of contestation that is not reducible to an ethical or legal understanding either in terms of individual conscience or of fidelity to the rule of law. In developing this account in more detail, I first define civil disobedience with an aim of spelling out why the standard liberal model, while providing (...) a useful starting point, ultimately leads to an overly constrained, domesticated and sanitized understanding of this complex political practice. Second, I place the political practice of civil disobedience between two opposing poles: symbolic politics and real confrontation. I argue that the irreducible tension between these poles precisely accounts for its politicizing and democratizing potential. Finally, I briefly examine the role of civil disobedience in representative democracies, addressing a series of recent challenges made in response to this radically democratic understanding of disobedience. (shrink)

Duygular; insanın epistemik, etik ve estetik yönleriyle doğrudan ilişkili varoluşsal özniteliklerdir. İnsan anlam-lı, değerli ve güzel bir hayat kurarken akılla birlikte duygulardan motivasyon almaktadır. Duygular, çok fonk-siyonlu yapısıyla insanın niyet, tutum, tavır ve eylemlerini belirleme, harekete geçirme, yönlendirme, etkile-me, dönüştürme, frenleme ve bazen de manipüle etme araçlarıdır. Bu nedenle ahlak başta olmak üzere insan eylemlerini problem edinen her araştırma, duyguları ele almak durumun¬dadır. İnsanı tam anlamıyla tanıma-nın yolu, pratik yaşantısı içerisinde ortaya çıkan duygusallığını anlamaktan geçer. Dolayısıyla teorik olanın durağanlığı ile (...) hayatın akışkanlığı arasındaki uçurumda duygular, felsefi bir soruşturmanın konusu olmakta-dır. Duygunun dinamik yapısını ve sınır çizilemeyen doğasını dilin sınırları içerisinde ifade etmek kolay değildir. Bu-nunla birlikte insan için duygular, kendini, evreni, doğayı, maddeyi, bireyleri, toplumları, iyiyi, kötüyü, değerli olanı ve olmayanı anladığı, olgu ve olaylarla başa çıktığı, pratik hayatını yönettiği, karar verme süreçlerinde, niyetlerinde, yönelimlerinde ve seçimlerinde etkin, tüm bu süreçlere içkin, dinamik, fonksiyonel ve bilişsel öznitelikler olarak öne çıkmaktadır. İnsan, günlük yaşamı içinde çok çeşitli duygu durumlarını tecrübe etmek-tedir. Böylece o, tecrübe ettiği bu duygu durumları ile sürekli değişen ruh hallerine sahip olmaktadır. Bu tec-rübeler, dış etkenlere bağlı olabildiği gibi insanın içsel dinamiklerinin etkisiyle de ortaya çıkabil¬mektedir. Sosyal yaşantısı itibariyle insan, duygusal tepkiler veren ve duygusal etkiler alan dinamik bir ahlak yaşantısı-na sahiptir. Bu bağlamda duygular, insanın kendi benliği ile yaşadığı toplumun benliği arasında denge kurma-sını sağlamakta ve insanın temel yönelimlerini belirlemektedir. Duygular, insana eylem motivasyonu kazan-dıran, onun tasavvurlarına, geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecekle ilgili değerlendirmelerine yön veren, harekete geçirici yetilerdir. Pişmanlık, bizzat benliğe yönelen ve onun ahlâkîliğini içsel olarak düzenleyip inşa eden ahlâkî bir özdenetim duygusudur. Bu duygu gerek bireysel ve gerekse sosyal yaşamda insanı etkileyen doğasıyla özel-likle ahlâkî değer dünyasında merkezi bir rol oynamaktadır. Pişmanlık, en yalın haliyle insanın geçmişteki eylemine ya da eylemsizliğine dönük olumsuz yargısını içeren acı bir his biçiminde ortaya çıkmakta ve keşke ifadesiyle dile gelmektedir. Pişmanlık duygusu insanda içsel tesirlerin etkisiyle oluşmaktadır. Çoğu ahlak duygusu gibi pişmanlık da hem fenomenolojik bir duyuş hem de bilişsel bir yargı içermektedir. Psikolojik ve kavramsal açıdan karmaşık bir duygu olan pişmanlık; üzüntü, hayal kırıklığı, özlem, nostalji ve bazen bir şey-den pişmanlık duymamanın verdiği rahatlama gibi bir dizi duyguyu ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Pişmanlık aynı zamanda güçlü, motive edici bir üzüntü ve işlerin istendiği gibi gitmediğine dair tutkulu bir şikâyet olarak da kendini gösterebilmektedir. O, bugünümüzü ve geleceğimizi şekillendiren genellikle geçmişe dönük bir acı deneyimidir. Pişmanlık, genellikle kişinin yaptığı şeyi onaylamadığını, farklı şekilde olmasını arzuladığını, üzüldüğünü, utandığını veya suçlu olduğunu ifade eden ve farkındalıkla ortaya çıkan bir duygudur. Pişmanlık, insanı geçmişteki ve şimdiki hatalarından ders çıkarmaya ve gelecekteki davranışlarını düzeltmeye teşvik eden, insanın özdenetim yeteneğinin bir parçasıdır. Bu duygu, kişinin kendi eylemleriyle ilgili içsel muhasebe-sinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan düzeltici ve iyileştirici ahlaki bir özdenetim duygusudur. Pişmanlık, insa-nın ahlaki doğasının zorunlu bir sonucudur. Bu duygu onun seçim yapabilen bir varlık olmasından, yani ahlaki özgürlüğünden kaynaklanmaktadır. Pişmanlığın oluşabilmesi için ahlaki eylemin en az iki seçenek arasından yapılacak bir seçim sonucunda gerçekleşmiş olması gerekir. Bu nedenle, pişmanlığın ön koşulu özgürlüktür. Akıl ve duygunun düşüncelerimiz ve eylemlerimiz üzerindeki karşılıklı rolleri, özellikle pişmanlık olgusunda belirgindir. Dolayısıyla ister pratik ister teorik alanda olsun pişmanlık, sadece insanın duygusal yanıyla değil, bilişsel yanıyla da ilgili bir duygudur. Pişmanlığın, geçmişte yaşanmış veya bugün etkisi devam eden bir olgu üzerinde kişinin hatasını fark etmesiyle oluşan bir üzüntü hali olması, onun bir değerlendirme duygusu oldu-ğunu gösterir. Duyguların harekete geçirici yönü pişmanlıkta geriye doğru işlevsiz olacağından, bu teşvik edici yön gelecekte pişmanlık yaratan durumun tekrarını önleme yönünde kendini göstermektedir. Böylece geç-mişte yaşanan üzücü bir durum, olumsuzdan olumluya, yıkıcıdan yapıcıya doğru ahlaki bir evrime zemin hazırlayacaktır. Bu makalede duygu etiğinin ilkeleri, kavramsal ve kuramsal çerçevesi göz önünde bulundurulmak suretiyle pişmanlık duygusunun mahiyeti, değeri ve fonksiyonelliği felsefî açıdan analiz edilip yorumlanacaktır. (shrink)

According to Ibn Khaldūn, man is a social entity deeply influenced by the geo-economics-politics of the environment in which he lives. The effect is seen as so strong that nearly all of these structures in their relationship to human beings are dominated by it. In this system, we see human beings as a creature who is both able to adapt himself to the environment and able to evolve in this harmony. From the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn, man cannot be evaluated (...) or defined separately from the environmental conditions, the technique and architecture he has developed. Ibn Khaldūn sees the primary source of this change to be the desire to make life both more prosperous and bearable. Therefore, the most natural motivations that affect man’s desire to alter the natural world are the environmental challenges that he encounters. The challenges that are imposed upon man in the natural world are those that have led to human progress. From badāwa (nomadic society) to ḥaḍāra (sedentary society) and so to the ceaseless drive of human progress that has served to make life more endurable, every effort in this sense leads to a physical and moral loosening as the incessant struggle to survive that defines human existence is made more bearable. Physical slack by breaking the resistance of man to resist the environmental conditions; and moral looseness by making man more vulnerable to the temptation of desires, pleasures and welfare that are the cause of moral dilemmas. Ibn Khaldūn’s moral thought with its social, political, and other fields of application are all contexts that enable an understanding of the devaluation of money-hedonist morality in all ways. This article aims to analyze the social, political and economic dilemmas and challenges that the capitalist, consumption-based money-hedonist morality (obesity, social media addiction, consumption, and moral devaluation in the face of financial, virtual and imagined valuations, etc.) from the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn. Summary: Man is endowed with both good and evil. Ibn Khaldūn notes that man tends to misuse these two orientations with a higher inclination towards evil, and that social conditions have an effect on this. He sees another characteristic of man, that they develop habits; accordingly, man is the child of his habits. Habits are second nature to man and affects all of his perceptions, particularly notions concerning truth. At the same time, human beings are under the constant influence of both habits, culture, and climate and geography; and all of these together affect our ethics, psychology and characteristics. Thus, man is a historical, social being that is changed, transformed and determined by adapting to these cultural, social, political and ecological conditions. The concept of Money-Hedonism is one that we have created by combining the terms monetarism, an economic concept, and hedonism, a concept in moral philosophy; the resulting term we seek to produce essentially translates as the adoration of Money. As is well known, hedonism refers to a philosophy of life that has its origins in the ancient Greek world which sees the purpose of life as one in which the pursuit of pleasure is the highest good. Whereas, Monetarism is an American-based economic view developed by Milton Friedman in 1970, linking all the balance in the economy to the supply and demand of money. According to this, the demand for money is operation, precaution and motives of speculation of individuals the amount of money they want to keep in cash on them. The power of an exchange tool increases with the amount and quality of what it is achievable in its utilization. In this respect, money has been an unprecedented source of power in modern society as a means by which change can be achieved. The increase in the power of money as an effective means as manifesting power has led to a socio-cultural and socio-economic superstructure around this power. In the life of an individual that is part of such a culture and is unable to isolate himself from the economy in which he lives, the values that can be expressed with money are consequently formed. In this structure, since the measure of life is money, money determines the quality of human life and human pleasure to a far greater degree than at any time in history. Thus, those living in this age have developed a new moral philosophy of value formed by the combination of these two concepts (monetarism and hedonism), which we have defined as Money-Hedonism. The money-hedonist individual is one that is in love with money, the joy of having it, the pleasure of using it, who desires it with immeasurable passion and ambition and is willing to use all legitimate and illegitimate methods of obtaining it. The most prominent characteristics of this type of individual is egoism, a desire to possess, hatred and mistrust. Ibn Khaldūn argues that the inhabitants of a city that live a settled life and who are living in the city have become economically prosperous and absorbed by consumption and pleasure, and, consequently morally degenerate as a result of the abuse of their evil nature. As can be understood from Ibn Khaldūn’s explanations, the basic element that determines the transition of people from the badāwi way of life to ḥaḍāri (settled) is the change in the livelihoods and related needs. He perceives this change as progressing from necessity to luxury, and, with this change, ethical concern in the nature of people being replaced by aesthetic care. In this way, since aesthetic concern reveals the dissatisfaction of the human self, man always pursues what is perceived to be better and more beautiful, and therefore he easily tends to any malignancy that may disrupt his religious and worldly peace. The ḥaḍāra community of Ibn Khaldūn versus the badāwa represent a modern society with a much more heterogeneous population, with a significant increase in lifestyle diversity along with urbanization. However, the determinative effect of the relationship with nature or the way in which society engage in economic activities have not changed. While modern people are urbanized, they are also heterogeneously shaped by psycho-social necessities demanded by urbanization. Man has created a new socio-psychological condition that not only affects the socio-economic but the way of forming a relationship through the accelerated development of new communication methods, facilitating access to information, and the opening of new methods of communication field between institutions. While man’s connection to nature has become disconnected, he no longer perceives himself as human being in nature but as a human within the city, the individual urban life and the law define this perception. The rupture from nature has created an inevitable result of alienation to nature as well as the estrangement of man with his own nature. The liberal policies adopted with capitalism have encouraged competition and free entrepreneurship. In the time that Ibn Khaldūn lived, man who created himself with his struggle in the nature brings himself / herself into the economic structure of competition in the modern period. Unlike in more traditional societies of the past, the modern way of life not only expresses itself in our new way of life and moral values, but also by statistical values. The exploitative and mathematical world, which forms the current economic science, shapes the socio-economic and socio-psychological structure of modern man. It is understood that the life brought by luxury renders the dynamic, subjective, disciplined sense of morality dysfunctional by destroying the moral values of man, particularly by reducing their feeling of shame. As a result, while the world of value of money-hedonism is solid, materialistic and cold; man in trying to exist in this world of value carries a flexible, spiritual and emotional nature. As such, human beings are pushed into social anomaly situations such as a constant conflict, dilemma, suicide, insecurity and solitude in this world of value. (shrink)

In the history of İslāmic thought, Māturīdī is a famous scholar both in the field of kalām and tafsir. Being approved by Māturīdī, the distinction of tafsir and ta’wīl, which makes possible to take the comments made about the verses into sistematic framework, is quite important. There is an important information both about content of the distinction approved by Māturīdī and the main reasons that necessiated this distinction in the introduction of Samarqandī’s Sharh at Ta’wīlāt. From this information, it is (...) understood that the distinction of tafsir and ta’wīl had dated back to older time than Māturīdī and previous scholars dealed with the problem that necessiated this distinction and Māturīdī inherited this distinction from his predecessors. Information in the Sharh at Ta’wīlāt reveals that according to Māturīdī the companions had made interpretation (ta’wīl) in addition to tafsir and the explanations made by certain evidences is tafsir too. Therefore this information gives us the opportunity flexing the acceptance of the idea “tafsir, is dedicated to the companions, ta'wīl is dedicated to fuqaha (jurists)” and asserting that companions and scholars made both tafsir and ta’wīl. In this paper, we will research whether the distinction tafsir and ta’wīl regarded by Māturīdī completely belonged to his or not and content of the distinction and its reasons. We will also analyze this distinction according to examples in the Ta’wîlāt. Summary: An important distinction is made between the concepts of tafsir and ta’wīl in the short preface of Māturīdī's tafsir, and this distinction is particularly prominent in contemporary tafsir studies. Because from the point of view of the value they carry, the explanations for these differences and concepts express the legitimacy of the following mufassirūn (writers of a commentary on the Qur’an) to be able to perform tafsir, as well as the value of the explanations found in tafsir literature in terms of certainty. In Ta'wīlāt, tafsir is described as the precise determination of what is intended. Determination of what is exactly intended in verse/wording is bound to certainly know the conditions under which it was revealed. Because they are the first to be addressed directly and they witnessed the context, the tafsir is only for the companions (ṣaḥābah pl. aṣḥāb). On the other hand, ta’wīl is not a definite determination of what is intended, but rather it is explained as putting the possibilities forward. In this case, ta’wīl is dedicated to the scholars after the companions. When we look at the other tafsir sources that include his views, it can be understood that this brief information in the preface of the tafsir which survived to our day is partially incomplete. Samarqandī's Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt is the most important of these sources. According to the information here, Māturīdī states that some scholars distinguish tafsir and ta’wīl from each other. In these distinctions, tafsir is either described in relation to a definitive statement or in relation to being familiar with the conditions of revelation, while ta’wīl is described as extracting meanings from the verses and making possible meanings without claiming certainty. These explanations show that the distinction between tafsir and ta’wīl in Ta'wīlāt's preface was mainly based on the period before Māturīdī. These statements, which Māturīdī transmitted from some scholars in the beginning of Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt, were then transmitted by Omar al-Nasafī, Mahāyimī and Molla Husrev. In some sources, it was also transmitted that similar explanations were made by scholars such as an-Nadr b. Shumayl, al-Hussein b. Fadl al-Bacelī and Ibn Durayd before Māturīdī.Some explanations of Māturīdī in Ta'wīlāt enables the theory of tafsir-ta’wīl to be understood at a wider level. When the examples are examined, it is observed that Māturīdī exhibited two types of attitude against the tafsir of the companions. He states that one of these is that if the transmission is true, what is intended is exactly what is stated in the narrated. The second is that he sometimes does not accept these explanations and suggests additional opinions. The reason he refuses is that sometimes he does not find the transmission reliable, and sometimes he thinks that companions performed ta'wīl. If this is the case, the dedication of ta’wīl to those coming later should not be absolutized. Because the companions can perform both tafsir and ta’wīl. The examples in Ta'wīlāt clearly reveal what areas tafsir, which is defined as a definite statement, covers. According to this, first, tafsir is related to the field of “invisible” about the past and the future. Secondly, its meaning and practice is only about the information of the “statement” about the issues that can be revealed by the Prophet (pbuh). In the third aspect, it is related to “revelation” information reporting the context in which the verses descended. In the beginning of Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt, Māturīdī says that the explanations made based on the definitive evidences such as mutawātir (repetition; narration reported by large number reporters) and ijmā (consensus) also fall under the category of tafsir. However, it is also necessary to add intellectual evidence to these evidences. Because intellectual evidence is also important in the epistemology of Māturīdī. In fact, the truthfulness of nass (text) is primarily based on intellectual evidence. First, the issues of theology are proven by certain intellectual evidence, and then, on the basis of this, the meanings expressed by the nass acquire the value of certainty and truthfulness. With the definitive acceptance of reason in theology, what some nass express confirm each other and are used as evidence in the process of interpretation. Therefore, since some of the intellectual evidence, ijmā and mutawātir news provide definitive information, explanations based on them are also seen as tafsir. Considering the fact that the above-mentioned evidence was also used by those coming after the companions, it can be concluded that tafsir can be performed by not only the companions but also those coming after them. In this case, it should be accepted that tafsir is not performed only by the companions, and that the succeeding mufassirūn can also perform tafsir as well as ta’wīl. When we look at the examples based on these evidence, there are two different situations in Ta'wīlāt. The first is that Māturīdī sometimes has views on evidence based on mutawātir and ijmā and sometimes suggests different opinions from the assumptions that he said there was ijmā in particular. Because these evidences are certain, it is understandable that he remains bound to them. However, as a possible reason for his opposition to ijmā, it can be said that he thinks only the following generations enter the scope of ijmā. Because, according to Samarqandī, Māturīdī's objection to such information does not seem possible, since ijmā of the companions in a matter is accepted. Although he sometimes said that there was ijmā, the reason why no such ijmā was mentioned in other tafsir sources and sometimes, it may be considered that he did not respect other views in the face of ijmā as a reason for including different views or it may be thought that he was unaware of the different views that were transmitted. The second remarkable situation is that according to Māturīdī, intellectual evidence, in particular, can reveal only the “knowledge of existence” of the issues related to theology. Māturīdī thinks that their nature cannot be certainly known, and that the explanations made regarding their nature are only ta’wīl. For this reason, he firmly rejects the interpretation of the khabarī attributes about Allah in accordance with the idea of tashbīh and tajsīm (anthropomorphism). (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

The Qur'an is a holy book on which many studies have been carried out by both Muslims and non-Muslims. In terms of its religious and cultural origins, Turkey is one of the countries where the most research on the Qur'an has been conducted. However, the fact that the studies and contributions will be gain a more important place in the international arena, the articles written about Qur'an in Turkey be addressed in various aspects in this article. For this purpose, the (...) articles have been classified firstly by the contents. Thus, it has been questioned which topics have been researched much and which ones have been researched relatively less. Secondly, the article also aims to determine how many articles composed about Qur'an in an interdisciplinary manner. And the numerical changes of the articles are also examined yearly. In addition, the number of articles related with Qur'an and written in a language except for Turkish is also determined in the article. Based on that, some evaluations are made about these articles and their authors. Finally, some formal, contextual and scientific procedural errors in the articles written about Qur'an have been examined, and it has been investigated whether there have been ethical violations in the articles or not. Lastly, various suggestions to eliminate the deficiencies, have been suggested. Since the excessive increase in the number of articles after 2015 made the research difficult, the determinations in the article are limited to the articles between 1930 and 2015. (shrink)

There are two widely accepted definitions of ilm al-tafsīr in the hāshiyahs on Anwār al-Tanzīl. The most accepted ones are as follows: Tafsīr is the science that investigates the states of the word of Allah in terms of signifying the will of Allah. This definition mainly belongs to al-Taftāzānī in his hāshiyah on al-Kashshāf. Despite the objections directed to it, the definition was accepted in the later phases and there were not any detailed discussions on it. From this point of (...) view, it can be concluded that there is a common tafsīr definition in Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs due to the fact that the majority concurred with this definition. The prevalence of this definition is also out of the question for al-Kashshāf hāshiyahs. Its prevalence in the following literature may be attributed to its implementation in accordance with the definition requirements. Because in the definitions made based on the subject, the subject is regarded as genus, and how this subject is addressed is also considered as a difference (fasl). Accordingly, in the above definition, the subject of the tafsīr is explained as the states of Kalam, and the direction in which it is addressed is expressed in terms of the will of Allah. Thus, the subject of tafsīr and its research direction were explained and its difference from other sciences researching the Qur’ān was also stated. According to the second most widespread definition in the hāshiyahs, tafsīr is a science in which the meanings of the Kalam of Allah are known in terms of human capacity/capability. This definition is more or less a description (rasm) compared to the previous one. Hence, it is a looser definition. For this reason, the definition does not allow tafsīr to be separated from other sciences. Because, the meanings of words in the Qur’ān, language sciences and religious sciences are also explored. However, in the other definition, the difference of tafsīr was taken into consideration by including the directional record and the will/intent expression more quickly. On the other hand, the second definition has a limitation of being based on human capacity/capability that reveals some features of the tafsīr more clearly. This limitation expresses that the research in tafsīr is based on suppositional data in one way and continuity in another. Both definitions in the hāshiyahs show that there are clear and common definitions of ilm al-tafsīr between the hijri 9th and 12th centuries. It is stated that with a few exceptions, in almost all of the hāshiyahs, the ilm al-tafsīr is divided into two parts as tafsīr and ta’wīl. The tafsīr here is based on narrative, and ta’wīl is based on reason. Explanation of both of them in this way can be seen in al-Kashshāf. Accordingly, it is understood that both concepts become evident in al-Kashshāf and Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs. However, when we look at some tafsīr introductions, and literature of ulūm al-Qur’ān, it is observed that vastly different explanations have been made about them. This gives the impression that there is no clear and widespread acceptance of them. However, by explaining as mentioned, their meaning becomes clear in the next literature. Because this explanation about them is essentially a statement that al-Māturīdī conveyed from his predecessors. Accordingly, an explanation about both concepts that was conveyed from the early period has gained acceptance and became widespread especially in the sharhs-hāshiyahs for the following process. Since al-Baydāwī associates both concepts with muhkam and mutashābih, the commentators also explained this relationship. They contain the definitions of the muhkam and mutashābih, which al-Baydāwī made in accordance with Shāfi‘ī method. Accordingly, muhkam are the ones that is clear in terms of what is meant, and do not need further explanation. Examples of muhkam are verses about shari‘a 'orders, inheritance distribution, transactions, and marriage issues. The provisions on these issues should be based on narrative, not reason. Thus, the explanation of muhkam becomes tafsīr. The mutashābih is interpreted since the meaning is not clear. In this case, their interpretation is also ta’wīl. The religious sciences that tafsīr benefits from are explained as being hadith, fiqh, theology, mysticism, and usūl al-fiqh, and this case expresses a general opinion. Literary sciences required for tafsīr are also described as glossary, derivation, morphology, grammar, bayān, ma‘ānī, and badī‘. However, there are two opinions about the knowledge of disciplines such as prosody, rhyme, qard al-shi‘r, khat, and inshā. According to one opinion, since these sciences are not related to the Qur’ān, it is not necessary to know them in order to interpret them. According to the other one, for a competent interpretation activity, these sciences must be known, and their data are thought to contribute to tafsīr. (shrink)

Interviewet er lavet i juli 2021. Dets formål er at belyse emner, der er centrale i Celikates’ tænkning, f.eks. den voksende højrefløjspopulisme, migration, voldelige versus ikke-voldelige protester, civil ulydighed og den kritiske filosofis rolle i dag. -/- When Celikates and I sat down digitally in July 2021, the interview’s primary purpose was to examine topics central to Celikates’ thinking, such as the rise of right-wing populism, migration, violent versus non-violent protest, civil disobedience, and the role of critical philosophy today.

The paper’s main goal is to compare laws banning hate speech with counterspeech as an effective method of curtailing hate speech. In the first part, the paper discussed three normative justifications for hate speech bans. Firstly, the line of argument developed by critical race theorists that assumes that hate speech leads to the direct harm and violation of individuals’ rights. Secondly, paper examines the Weimar model that rests on the assumption that hate speech can lead to indirect harm to members (...) of vulnerable minorities by creating a toxic environment, which opens the door to discrimination and even violence. Thirdly, the justification which is derived from the idea that such forms of extreme public speech violate the basic values and principles – such as inclusiveness, equality and mutual respect - on which constitutional democracies are built. This approach extends its argument from general values to the status of citizens by arguing that hate speech violates the equal standing of citizens by attempting to exclude certain members of society from the process of democratic deliberation based on their ascriptive characteristics. The second part of the paper looks at counterspeech as an efficient approach to limit harms that arise from hate speech. The author argues that legal bans should be reserved only for the most extreme forms of hateful rhetoric, while counterspeech is a valid option for tackling all other forms of hate speech. (shrink)

Academic integrity is a vital pedagogical responsibility that educational institutions should explicitly address. One of the best ways to uphold academic integrity is to create a culture of academic integrity throughout the school. This is especially imperative at high schools where students develop their moral identity because students who act dishonestly at high school will likely behave accordingly in post-secondary education and ultimately be dishonest in familial and professional settings. Creating a culture of academic integrity is a challenging, long and (...) multifaceted journey. In this respect, this exploratory case study set out to create a culture of academic integrity at a high school in Türkiye and explore what facilitates and impedes the process. We followed Stephens’ (2016) Multilevel Intervention Model and implemented a School-Wide Education program to guide us through the process. We conducted various activities throughout one academic year, from seminars to competitions. At the end of the term, we conducted individual and focus group interviews with the members of the school community and analyzed the interview data to identify facilitators and barriers of the process. The analysis yielded five facilitators (1) creating buy-in, (2) administrative embracement and support, (3) activities that promote student involvement, (4) external expert and school collaboration as praxis, and (5) policy as the blueprint and five barriers (1) deficiencies in responding academic misconduct, (2) prioritization of academic success over academic integrity, (3) teacher resistance against change, (4) exam-based assessment design, and (5) timing of the activities. Each theme was discussed in detail, and recommendations were made for high schools which set out on a journey of creating academic integrity culture. (shrink)